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Federal Estate Taxation-INTER Vivos GiFT BETWEEN CO-OWNERS OF
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS REQUiRES SURRENDER AND REIsSUE- United
States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973).
At the present time there are approximately 500 million Series E United
States Savings Bonds outstanding about 75% of which are registered in the
names of co-owners.' Until recently there had been no consensus in the
federal courts as to whether a registered co-owner of such a bond could
remove it from his gross estate by making an inter vivos gift to the other
co-owner without having the bond reissued according to Treasury Regula-
tion procedures.' This conflict in case law and its attendant confusion has
had the effect of preventing uniform application of federal estate tax law
concerning savings bonds. The issue was recently resolved in the United
States Supreme Court decision of United States v. Chandler, which held
the bonds includable in the gross estate for purposes of the federal estate
tax.3
In Chandler the decedent had purchased numerous Series E bonds
which she registered in co-ownership form in the name of herself and one
of her granddaughters. In 1961, the decedent made an irrevocable inter
vivos gift of the bonds to each of her two granddaughters by delivering the
bonds to them with donative intent. However, the decedent did not have
the bonds reissued in the granddaughters' names.4 At the donor's death in
1. Estate of Elliot v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 152 n.8 (1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1008 (5th
Cir. 1973).
2. For a detailed discussion of the divergent pre-Chandler decisions on the issue see notes
8-12 infra.
3. 410 U.S. 257 (1973). A federal district court in California originally heard this matter
and held for the estate. Chandler v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In a
per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision and also adopted the district
court's reasoning. United States v. Chandler, 460 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1972). On appeal the
United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision.
4. The factual situation in Chandler typifies the situation in the various cases that have
dealt with this issue. A benevolent individual will purchase Series E government bonds
registered jointly as payable to himself or one or more of his children, or payable to himself
or his wife. Sometime during his life the individual will attempt to make an outright gift of
the bonds to the co-owner by actual or constructive delivery. However, the donor will fail to
surrender the bonds and have them reissued in the name of the donee pursuant to the
Treasury Regulations. On the donor's death, the government claims that the full value of the
bonds is includable in the decedent's gross estate. The estate argues that the inter vivos gift
was complete under the state's personal property laws and that therefore the bonds have been
eliminated from the decedent's estate prior to his death. See, e.g., Estate of Curry v. United
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1962, an audit of her estate tax return was conducted by the Internal
Revenue Service and it was determined that the value of the bonds should
have been included in the gross estate under the broad joint tenancy provi-
sions of § 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.- The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in affirming the district court's decision, ruled that the
decedent had completely divested herself of any interest in the bonds prior
to her death.'
Both the Third and Ninth Circuits had interpreted the Treasury Regula-
tions as not requiring a reissuance of a bond in order for a co-owner donor
to transfer his interest in the bond to the other registered co-owner. The
Third Circuit case of Silverman v. McGinnes had ruled that the regula-
tions were only applicable to questions relating to the contract obligation
of the debtor government to pay the bond.8 According to Silverman, an
inter vivos gift of a bond to a co-owner would not jeopardize the federal
government's obligation to pay a bond pursuant to its contract. This ap-
proach recognizes a gift to another co-owner as a completed gift for federal
estate tax purposes by applying the equitable principles of state property
law.9 In Silverman, the court thought it unnecessary to apply the Treasury
States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969); Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3rd Cir. 1958);
Estate of Elliot v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 152 (1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.
1973).
None of the above cases, including Chandler, were concerned with deliveries made in
contemplation of death, therefore, Internal Revenue Code of 195,4, § 2035 which covers this
subject is not relevant to the situation in Chandler.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
the interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as
tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and payable to either or the
survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such
other person and never to have been received or acquired by the latter from the
decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
The purpose of this section is to prevent a decedent from avoiding the estate tax by simply
putting his property in the form of a joint interest with a right of survivorship. The law
therefore requires the decedent to be taxed on all property subject to the joint interest to the
extent that he supplied the consideration for the property. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S.
363 (1939). The characteristic feature of a joint interest which causes it to be included in the
decedent's gross estate is the right of survivorship. Estate of Boogher, 22 T.C. 1167 (1954).
6. United States v. Chandler, 460 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. 259 F.2d 731 (3rd Cir. 1958).
8. Id. at 733. It should be noted that the court in Silverman does not doubt that the
Treasury Regulations have the full force of law. However, it concludes that the scope of their
application does not include determinations of the rights of individual citizens arising out of
transactions between themselves.
9. In Silverman, the court states that it is "impressed with the results and the reasoning"
reached in various state cases which have dealt with this same question with respect to state
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Regulations to an inter vivos transfer between registered co-owners, since
there was no risk of possible payment to unregistered adverse claimants.'
Presumably, such a risk would only arise upon a transfer from a registered
owner to a stranger without a reisssuance of the bond.
When this issue came before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals the
Silverman rationale was not followed." That court felt that the Treasury
Regulations required that the bonds be includable in the donor's estate.
However, the opinion failed to offer any supportive reasoning concerning
the applicability of the regulations to the issue.
2
inheritance or estate taxes. The cases cited by the court stress the equitable rights of the
donees of the bonds. 259 F.2d at 733-34. See, e.g., In re Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463,
56 N.W.2d 711 (1953); see also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 788 (1955).
10. Cases representative of this position regard the primary purpose of the Treasury Regu-
lation's prohibition against unregistered transfers as the prevention of the government's in-
volvement in disputes that may arise between adverse claimants. 259 F.2d at 734. See In re
Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953); Littlejohn v. County Judge, 79
N.D. 550, 58 N.W.2d 278 (1953).
In its Chandler opinion, the district court held adverse to the government because the
evidence in the case was sufficient to show that the donor intended to release her survivorship
interest. In this opinion, later adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the interest that the government
had in the inter vivos transfer betwen co-owners was seen to be so slight that it did not justify
application of federal laws. Chandler v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1263, 1268 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
11. Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969). Curry held that the
regulations required a surrender and registration in the name of the donee in order to be
effective, but the opinion evades any direct explanation of the Treasury Regulations them-
selves. The court was content to rely on a 1953 federal case, Guldager v. United States, 204
F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1953). The case involved a Michigan law under which all bonds payable
simply to husband or wife created an estate by the entireties. However, the Sixth Circuit held
that even if the Series E bonds had been registered to joint tenants by the entireties, the rights
of creditors as prescribed in the regulations would not be affected. The court concluded that
the estate created by these bonds was controlled by federal laws and not by Michigan law.
204 F.2d at 489.
12. In 1971, the Tax Court offered a detailed explanation on how the Treasury Regulations
required a reissuance by the co-owner. Estate of Elliot v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 152 (1971)
aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1008 (1973). The Tax Court in Elliot recognized and appreciated the
sharp conflict that existed between Curry and Silverman. However, the court felt Curry
represented the sounder view. The opinion offers an explanation of how the Treasury Regula-
tions applicable at the time of the gift should be interpreted. Paramount in the court's
reasoning was its conclusion that the Treasury Regulations are clear as to ownership and
transferability of the bonds. In fact, the reverse side of a Series E bond itself states that it
is non-transferable except pursuant to the Treasury Regulations. On the face of the bond is
stamped "NON TRANSFERABLE." 57 T.C. at 160.
Probably the most logical argument in favor of the Elliot decision deals with the survivor-
ship rights of the donor if the putative donee dies first. The regulations clearly provided that
if a registered co-owner dies, the other registered co-owner becomes the sole and absolute
owner. Therefore, if a putative donee dies before his donor dies, the federal contract would
not recognize the donee's administrator or executor as the successor to the bonds, but they
1973]
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The irreconcilable positions that had been taken by the lower Federal
courts on the applicability of the Treasury Regulations were noted by the
Supreme Court in its decision of United States v. Chandler.'3 In Chandler,
the Court ruled that the Treasury Regulations were controlling and that
the value of the bonds given to the co-owner must be included in the donor
decedent's gross estate for tax purposes unless the bonds had been properly
reissued.
The applicable Treasury Regulations'4 provide that the "form of regis-
tration used must express the actual ownership of and interest in the bond
and . . . will be considered as conclusive of such ownership and interest."' 5
Furthermore, it is provided that no judicial proceeding can give effect to
an attempted voluntary inter vivos transfer.'6 Another section provides
that during the joint lives of the co-owners payment will be made at ei-
ther's separate request, or that it can be reissued during the co-owners'
lives in the "name of either, alone, or with a new co-owner. . ."7 Upon the
death of a co-owner, the other will be recognized as the "sole and absolute
owner" for all purposes of reissue.'8
would still belong to the living co-owner who ostensibly gave the bonds away in the first place.
Id. at 160, 161.
After the United States Supreme Court rendered the Chandler decision in January of 1973,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision and reasoning in Elliot in a memorandum
opinion. Reference was also made to Chandler as the final rule with regard to any future
disputes. 474 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973).
13. 410 U.S. 257 (1973).
14. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue United States Savings Bonds and
to promulgate regulations concerning their transfer. 31 U.S.C. § 757c(a) (1970). These Treas-
ury Regulations have the force of law. Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731, 733 (3rd Cir.
1958). See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
The Federal Regulations are continually being revised by the issuing agencies. The individ-
ual volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations are revised yearly to keep pace with the
changes. The Treasury Regulations that are in effect during the year of an alleged transfer of
Series E bonds are the controlling law regardless of when the case is heard. Therefore, the
Treasury Regulations that were in effect in 1961 when the decedent in Chandler allegedly
made an inter vivos gift to her co-owner are controlling in this case. The substantive portions
of the Code that are applicable here have not experienced any major changes up to the present
time. However, some shuffling of the various provisions has occurred between the applicable
sections which makes a reference to a numbered Code section confusing if a volume for that
particular year is not available for reference.
15. 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1961).
16. 31 C.F.R. § 315.20(a) (1961).
17. 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (1961). This 1961 version also described the procedure for reissu-
ance during the lives of both co-owners. This portion of the provision is presently a separate
section numbered 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1972).
18. 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1961). This section related to payment or reissue after the death




The Court noted that, according to the Treasury Regulations, a co-owner
who transfers his interest without reissuance retains a right to have the
bond redeemed during his lifetime, 9 in addition to a right of survivorship
if the putative donee dies first."0 Accordingly, in Chandler the Court held
these interests were retained by the decedent at the time of her death
despite her apparent intent to relinquish all possession and control of the
bonds. Application of Section 2040 was therefore required, and the value
of the bonds was included in her gross estate.2' That section of the Internal
Revenue Code requires the value of any interest held jointly to be included
in the gross estate to the extent that the decedent supplied the considera-
tion.2
Despite the presence of some convincing arguments for adopting the
Silverman rationale," the Court in Chandler wisely viewed the need for
uniformity in tax treatment and recordkeeping by the government as para-
mount to the need for free transferability of co-owned savings bonds. 4 The
need for uniform application of laws in this area should not be subjugated
to the imposition of inconsistent state property laws.2 Series E bonds are
19. 410 U.S. at 261. A literal reading of 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (1961) requires the government
to pay the bond to whichever registered owner requests payment first, thereby extinguishing
the other co-owner's interest in the bond. If one co-owner attempted to make a gift of the
bond to the other co-owner, but failed to have it reissued solely in the donee's name, it is
entirely possible under the regulations for the putative donor to still obtain payment of the
bond if he can obtain possession of it in some way. Chandler has now offered a procedure to
avoid this equivocal result. A potential donee is now on notice that without a surrender and
reissue his donor remains a full and equal co-owner.
20. 410 U.S. at 261. An attempted gift without reissue from one co-owner to another would
not cut off the putative donor's right to become the absolute owner should the donee die first.
Because the donor retains this survivorship right given by the Treasury Regulations, he
cannot avoid § 2040 if he dies with this right. See note 5 supra for further discussion of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2040.
21. See note 20 supra.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. Two arguments in Silverman are particularly impressive. The first is that the proceeds
of the bonds should equitably belong to the donee in accordance with the standards of state
property laws which focus on intent and delivery. The second argument concerns the fre-
quently repeated statement that the only purpose of the Treasury Regulations is to prevent
government involvement between adverse claimants to the bonds. If this is true, then the
regulations are inapplicable to this tax problem because the government has already pro-
tected itself from liability as long as it pays any registered co-owner. 259 F.2d 731 (3rd Cir.
1958).
24. 410 U.S. at 262.
25. The government's intention to prevent absolute freedom of transferability is possibly
best evidenced by the language of 31 C.F.R. § 315.20(a) (1972):
No judicial determination will be recognized which would give effect to an attempted
voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond or would defeat or impair the rights of survivor-
ship conferred by these regulations upon a surviving coowner or beneficiary.
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federally issued and necessitate the uniform treatment prescribed in
Chandler. Now that an invariable standard has been clearly established
for estate tax purposes, co-owners will know exactly what procedures must
be followed in transfers of their savings bonds. Despite the formality re-
quired by the Chandler rule, it nevertheless appears to be a welcome relief
to a previously uncertain area of estate planning.
R.C.B.
While the final results in Chandler and Elliot are the same, the opinions differ as to the
applicability of Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). That case involved a provision of Texas
community property law which in effect prevented a married couple from taking advantage
of the survivorship clause in the Treasury Regulations in cases where the purchase price was
paid out of community funds. When Mrs. Free passed away, the other co-owner of the bonds,
her husband, claimed exclusive ownership because of the survivorship clause (now contained
in section 315.62), while the beneficiary in the will claimed an interest because of the com-
munity property law. The Court held that the inconsistent Texas community property law
must yield to the Treasury Regulations which clearly confer a full right of survivorship on
the remaining co-owner. The Chandler Court was in complete agreement with Free and
proclaimed that their decision in Chandler was required by it. 410 U.S. at 262.
The Tax Court in Elliot did not feel Free applied to this particular question because none
of the co-owner's rights as survivors were at issue as in Free. However, the Tax Court inti-
mates that some of the broad language in Free may be applicable. 57 T.C. at 157.
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